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The Commission proposed. to forward more detailed oomm1Jnications to -the CoUD~il
on some of the aspects dealt with in the overall o:ommunioatio:n of 21 Ma,yo
. ...... .. ..... 
-J 
... ..,
This communication deals with the question of produot* agreements designed to
limit excessive price fluctuations. The problem of the seauri ty of supplies
of the consumer countries which i8 closely oonneoted wi th product agreemen'
i B not covered here  Moreover, this problem is also linked w:i.th the produceI'
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Within the meaning of thi.s communication "produot agTeements" are agreements
concluded. between countries .produ.oing and~consuming oommoditiesit the aim generally
being to sta'bili ze the prices, of -the Produots in question in J.nternatlonal tradee
According to the arrangements established since th.e' ~~va.na Charter (t1947~8) suoh
agreements must normally be concluded between producers and oonsumers$
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Throughout this communication the term Deproduots~~ or "oommodi ties
1H1 has bean
used since it has a wider :m'9axd.ng than liraw materia1st~ I
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II.
This suggests the main oondi tions which must 'be met ~f a 
product agreement is to have the greatest possible chances of success.
Table A 
1 sumrr, rizes a number of data relating to these oondi tions.
EssentiaJ. ly, the harmonious development, of prices nmst be ensured.
In order to achieve this , the product in question:
i. ~st ha va a pri ce or a set of pri cas which is as independent as possible 
that is the market for the product must not be dominated by a. rival product
(for ins~ance, by synthetics in the case of jute or rubber); i t must not be
a by-product or part of a group of products in respect of which the prices and
earnings may be manipulated arbi trarily, as is the case wi th chemical products
(see column VI of Table A in thi s oonneotion);
ii. Must be suffioient1y homogeneous to enable a price - or a "olose
family of prices - to reflect the economic trend of the product over a period
of time.
This is not the case for various animal produots-- (see column V
of Table A)"
fuis tMle, like ~st of fue pro~ct data ~ven in fuis t~t , relates to ~e
eighteen UNCTAD products sui table for stockpiling,  accounting ~or 55-60% of
world trade in commodities.~
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iii .. tastly, the data published on the tr01:;l of prices must be represel"1tati v~;
of the market as a whole. Thus the prices of minerals do not meet these
oondi tions, most of the mines being "oapti veil (iron and bauxite for example) 
1 .
(b) For a product agreement to play the role i t is assigned effeoti vely ,
i t is impor.tant that i t bring together the main producers and oonsumers.
i. The developed consumer countries, for their part, have up till now had
mixed vi ewe on these agreement s .
The a tti tude of the developed producer countries - namely Canada, Australia
(virtually at all times) and a few smaller countries such as Sweden - towards
product agreements is naturally determined by their interests as exporters.
It is also desirable that the Share of world production in international
. trade should be substantial. This is not the case with rice. for example.- 5 -
In the United States the si tuation as regards the main oommodi ties is more
or less balanced - though slightly weighted in favour of imports; the count~
is a major exporter of a number of commodi ties , suoh as cotton and phosphates,
paper pulp, 1~oodt leathe~ hides and skins and certain metals. Its 81 tuation
is therefore basically different from the Community's. The country'
attitude totv,8,rds product agreements would:- seem~t,o'be under review. 
-. - -.
The state-trading consumer countries have shown a changeable atti tud~
depending on the products in question (see Table B in annex). Their
participation is desirable to ensure that the agreements function properly.
It is important to stress the point that a DUmber of developing countries
are big importers of commodities.
1i. The si tuation regarding the producers is much more diversified.
For each product the list of producers varies- particularly widely in the
case of minerals. Certain products - such as sugar, coffee, cotton, iron
ore and bauxite - are exported by several dozen countries  whereas others
are exported only by half a dozen or so.
Column III of Table A gives a simple index of this spread: the number of
countries providing 75% of world exports. Here the figures vary widely.
(0) Column IV of the same table gives another indication which is important
\vhen examining a price stabilization system: the intensi ty of price
fluotuations reflected by the Gini index 1 . 
It can be seen for example that
the prices of mineral products fluctuate more than others , especially where
the minerals are not extracted from ttcapti vetl mines, as iron and bauxite are.
"'1...,111 l.1II:1.  r 11:1
- ....
Average of the absolute values for the annual variations... 6 IIIID
(d) Another characteristic, contained in oo11TInn II, is the actual volume
of trade to be stabilized; it is this whicl1 largely determines the amount
of financing which might be needed to achieve stabilization.
. .
There is a clear distinction here between the ttmajor" products - wheat,
oopper, sugar, coffee, cotton, iron ore, maize, wool, rice - and the others.
(e) Also included in Table A are two sets of structural data which, though
not a determining factor in a  world context as regards the possibility of 
concluding agreements, must be taken into consideration by the Community as
a pot ant ial partner.
These are:
the Community s degree of dependence on external imports for its supplies
(column VII); and
the extent to which the products in question are exported qy developing
countries (oolumn VIII).
(r) Although each of the columns in Table A enables an order of preference
to be established between the products as regards their suitability for the
conclusion of a product agreement, the order varies widely from column to
column and it is diffioul t to analyse these data as a whole eBpeoial~ as
the various conditions  or  characteristics are not of equal importance and
are not all  quantifiable... 1 ..
However, if the list of 18 products is examined, it can be seen tr.a.t:
for 1vheat, maize, rice and sugar, proposals for product agreements
have 8. :'~eady been made in- the context of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations;
agreements exist on tin, cocoa and coffee (to be renegotiated soon)
and, unofficially, tea;
jute, hard fibres and rubber are too dominated by rival products to
enable meaningful agreements to be concluded;
iron ore and bauxite supplies are largely capti va and the free market
is not representative.
Consequently, in studying the possible creation of new product agreements
tt ant ion must be focussed on the following among the 18 products:
copper
zinc
lead
cotton
wool
Imports of' these five products into the Oolmllunity amount to 11 4. 500 million
per annum, that is 40% of total imports of the 18 products.. ..
' 8
The following reservations should also be noted:
The two textile fibres low degree of homogeneity &lid their
dependence with regard to su1?sti tutes;
The relatively slight importance of lead and sino, aDd partioularlT 
of wool, to the developing countri... !'
.. .
Low or average concentration of producers, especially as regards
cotton.
i1. If ,certain products other than the ,18 listed but often referred to
in international discussions are . ined, it will be noted that:
bananas aDd oleaginous products are extremeq heterogeneous;
the same applies to wood and wood products, and leather, hides and
skins - the latter being subject to keen competition from synthetical
world manganese and phosphate reserves are very high and, in part,
relatively secure;
chromium, tungsten and platinum present specific problems of
security of supplies; the solution here would be to establish
reserve stocks of a non-bu.t'fer nature.
The provisional conclusion stated under i. above with regard to the it 
products th~efo:re remains valid if "the analysis is extended beyond the
18 commodi ties.- 9 -
III. Methods
... -)"'..~
The aim is to stabilize markets which are marked "'by frequent and substantial
disparities between supply and demand, resultirlg in particularly sharp price
rises and falls 1 .
Numerous methods are employed to achieve auoh stabili"zation and ten or so have
been studied.i The main features of their operation are analysed below. Details
of existing agreements are supplied in Table B which is annexed to this paper.
Quot as J J
Thi s is a method daTi ved from producers ' cart als : if supply exceeds demand -
which is the typical case since the agreements have so far generally been
devised with the primary aim of resolving the problems of produoers ... a system
of export quotas (or possibly production quotas) is applied.
Example  Agreements on sugar and coffee 
Ad vantage: Costs are limi tad to administrati va expenses.
Disadvantage: No severe or automatic penalty.
Both agreements are at present in abeyance following operational difficulties 
The sugar agreement appli ed only to the world market, to the exclusion
of the markets covered by the special arrangements of the USA, the USSR
and the United Kingdom.
\II' J boI. 11 ..Ii!toj.
This instability of the oommodi ty markets is noticeably more marked
than that of the marlcet in manufactured product s "
In the reverse el tu~ion, i~orl ~otae mi~t be considered. effeoti veness of such machine~ is questionableo
The- 10 -
i1. In the case 0 f coffee t the ve~ large number of produoers , the
administration of the qllotas and the relevant controls , plus
disagreements between producers and consumers as to price levels,
have resulted in serious difficulties.
Buffer stocks
An undoubtedly more effeotive, but also more costly method than quotas
consists of setting up buffer stocks.
1 . Tradi tional buffer stocks 11 I I ' r
These involve going against the customary trend of business operations since
firms tend normally to stock when prices are rising and to run down stocks
when prices are falling. Such stooks lie heavily on the market and intensify
the fluotuations.
So here the strategy has to be reversed and a stabilizing effect produced 
buying when prices fall, which helps to bring prices up, and selling when
they rise, which helps to moderate the rise.
It is obvious that a practical effect will be obtained!
only if the stocks are administered jointly by all the - parties conQerned
and there is sufficient agreement among" -them in pariiwlar as rega-:ds
ma.ximum and minimam' pri ces ;
and if the financial resources or the actual stooks at the disposal of
the stock-building author! ties are sufficient to influence the market.
'V  r r 
- .
In the only such oase in operation, oonoerning tin, those concerned
so far have been the producer countries and, more recently, the Netherlands and Franoe. 11 -
For the ptJ.rp0se of. determining the extent of , these resourc
'" 
there 1:as 1::Ea1 a tendmiCJf tc~ 
follow until now the long-standing but rat 11 Et J:Y sl. mplistio rule, formulated
by Keynes in 1'942, according to which a. buffe:r~ stock should be made up of
th e equi val ant  f three months' wo rId expo rt a of the product s in que at ion 1 
This qu.esti(':11. of the size of stooks is most important since the sums
involved arE; 1,fery large. Aooording to an UNCTAD estimate, the 18 products
suitable for stock-piling on which it concentrated, involve a total of
~11 000-13 000 million. To the cost of acquiring the stooks must be
added the annual interest charges warehousing, tM9 cost of placing goods in
stocks and taking them out again, and the costs arising from the deterioration
of products , which is diffioul t to avoid. On the other hand any stocks which
have been acquired - n6rmally at times of slack market activity - should
produce oapi tal gains. Calculations comparing the advantages and oost 
arising from application of the system must be made very carefully in the
various possible cases before any decision is taken in favour of this
method, or any of the others for that matter.
2.  .9Y,cl al" ..s~r c)c:-puilp.,~r..s:
It is possibly not essential , however, to resolve in advance the problem
of the 8i ze of stocks provided one does not adopt as a rigid rule - which 
any case would not be observed effectively - the maintenance of prices
wi thin a predetemined "tunnel ft" 1 and the prevention at all oosts of speculation
c.. at ei thar extreme , but is content to moderate the fluctuations by smooth:t.
out the price curv"
III I I -
Keynes subsequently suggested that it would perhaps be preferable to
establish the si ze of stocks at six months' exports. In practice the
tin stock corresponds to one and a half months' exports and the one
being considered for cocoa represents exports over two and a half
months. No conclusions can be drawn from the cocoa agreement since
no stocks have yet been bui It up; the tin agreement works well when
prices are falling but does not enable ceilings to be maintained
sati sfactori ly.
I ..
To  do this , various rules haye been devised and applied, particularly
in the case of the tin agreement  The latest provides for the tunnel
to be divided into three parallel bands  the upper and lower ones
entail an obligation on the part of the stock authorities to sell or
buy unti 1 funds or stocks are used up; more flexible roles apply in
respect of the middle bando.. 
12 
...' , '
One could invert the picture and' suppose that the 'WOrld community 
ready to allot a certain sum for the pu.rpo:i~ of helping to stabilize
the price of a given product, the sum probably being calculated on the
basis of the amount of annual trade and in the light of experience of
the functioning of the market for the product in question.
This kind of stock-building, which might be described oonventionall1 as
cyolioal" stock-building, would perhaps produce a relatively better
result for a given amount of capital eX!IU911diture' ,tF18,n a, bUffer stock pure and
simple
, "
of 'the t' agreement type.
A simple calculation shows that, apart from the capital inpu.t necessary to
build up the stock, the operation could be financed by a 3~ levy on imports
of the products concerned.
3. Coordinated national stocks 1 I . I f 1
. .
Another variant would consist not of centrally administered stooks 
but  of  national stocks coordinated with a view to achieving stabilization.
It is this variant that the Community has proposed at OA'l"l',  in the context
of  the multilateral negotiations, for cerealsf sugar and rice.
. ;
From the cost angle, if the costs borne by the various participants 1 are edeied
together this variant must appear comparable to the centralized stocks
variant; its effectiveness depends entirely on the cohesion of the
stock-building countries. 
The stock-building systems ' referred to above, especially the first one, mq
give rise to frequentlydjfficu.lt negotiations on terms and above all '
minimum and maximum pri oas.
, . , "
I .
. '
- 11 1 -
It should be noted that offsetting one national component against another -
a source of savings 
... 
cannot be undertaken easily in a decentralized s7stem.a:I 13 
~::~~
r:m e~o~~~~ct s
Another method of ensuring stability 011 the ~'l\:et of  a.. product consists in
concluding as ma.t1Y long-term contracts as possible which take account of
forecast supply and demand.
But,
on the one hand, errors in forecast s and unforeseen factors are
inevitable..
For this reason it is advisable to make provision for a "safety net"
stock. This is what UNCTAD pro:p(;~J3eS in its integI'ated progr a:rom
It is probable '~hat such a. stock being of an ancillary nature rather
than the main stock, could be lesa costly than those referred to above.
On the other hand, the essential difficulty lies above all in the
fact that although the socialist countries and most of the developing
countries conduct their foreign trade in primary products through
centralized bodies and can easily conclude the contracts in question
this is only part ially so or not so at all in the case of the
liberal developed countries.
Moreover , the UNCTAD document acknowledges this n~j or difficulty,
which, in present circumstances, makes recourse -to systems of this kind
extreme~ unoertain~ The difficulty is increa~ed by the recent tendency
in international trade to abandon observance of the principIa that
agreement a are to be honoured  .E.~Ci~_'
erxan~~ 
~p:p~)
It should be pointed out that the funot ioning of systems based on lon~term
contract B - and indeed of quota~based syst ems - can ~e strengthened by
financial mechanisms such as those dealt with belowe.. 14 
D. Financial mechanisms
mJII T 1-$...1
These are to be distingnished from the mechanisms dealt with above by the
fact that they involve the p~ent , on the b~0is of  quantities agreed between
sellers and purchasers, of sums of money which are to be used to mitigate
the effects of extreme fluctuations of prices.
The stook is in a sense replaced by a fund and does not have to be built up
physically.
For example the Oommission'l s departments are studying, in the important .case
of copper, a system of negotiated floor and ceiling prices with levies paidl
by the consumers, if prices fall below the floor;
by the producers, if prices exceed the ceiling;
by both, if prices are between the floor and ceiling.
The attractive aspect is the simplicity of the mechanism resulting in lower
administrative oosts. Furthermore, it' is not necessary here to build up capital.
This mechanism, like others ana-lysed here permits differential treatment
in favour of the developing countries and the possibility of subsidi~ aims.
But this newly devised mechanism has never been tested.
. .. ... 
15 
...
m.q~ll~d qstepts
Apart from the combinations referred to at the foot of page 13, a number
of these have been proposed or put into operation.
(a) the ooooa agreement is based on quotas but also involves the
Bett illg up of a buffer stock should the quota arrangement s not
be sufficient to bring about stabilization.
(b) An interesting case is the proposal made by the Commission to the
Council in 1910 on oleaginous products.. It is probably the most
complete system so far devised 
i.  import levies;
ii. buffer stooks for the relatively homogeneous lauric oils,
iii. pa;yments to the developing countries, in particular to
enable single-product producers to di versifYJ
(iv) food aid.
(0) The various wheat agreement s. have cCi)ntained a food aid. component, the
importance of which has been oo11$tantly increasing.
(d) National stoo~s particularly those of the United States, the United
Kingdom and France, serve not only as buffers but also as reserve
stooks, part icularly where there is a risk of the supply of certain
strategically important products being cut off. Such products are,
however, few in number and 1 imi t ad in value..---16--
qt p.er .S~');  ~1D~
There at'e a ntUDber of systems which are lirikea t1?~:)re or less oloseq with those
mentioned above.
The following can be mentioned:
(a) the agreement on observance of pri 4:~~~1a for milk products proposed by the
Communi tif t 0 GATT "
This involves maximum and minimum prices but no stockpiling. It, shouldi
poBsi bla to keep to these prices in view of the limited  number of world
market suppliers.
(b) the arrangements on whole milk powder and sldmmed-milk powder (OECD 1963,
GATT 1 ~'P),  which are still in force, and on butter tat and butteroil
( GATT 1972) 
(0) the unofficial agreements oonolud.ed under the aegis of FAO on tea, on
jute and hard fibres and on pepper.
These are "lightweight" agreements. They involve, in partioular, the
fixing of target prices and action on the part of' the producers, who
are few in number and (in the case of fibres) very much threatened by
competition, with a view to limiting their exports,
(d) lastly, in an agreement such as that on oliva oil a completely different
objective is being pursued: that of information ' on and sales promotion
for the product 
~I 1r'C!.:J1 1 IL ' r  Jf I a I II  T 1 - T S  1 'I I
Apart from the agreements covered by the definition~: .-of. product agreements
~he following should be mentioned:
(a) the open international bodies concerned with a single product, in particular
the study gI'oups on lead r zinc , rub bar and tungat en.
These bring together producers and consumers and have as their main
function exchanging information and statistics and studying certain
technical problems - for example the competition between natural and
synthetic rubber;
(b) the bodies which are at least partly closed; consisting mainly of
producers, these have tended to develop in 1974 and 1915. Examples
are the international bawd te arrangement grouping together seven oountries;
CIPEC, grouping together the four non-industrialized producers of copper:
Zaire, Zambia, Chile and Peru (1967); the iron ore group (1974) which
is holding negotiations and expanding; the manga;nese group; the mercury
group (Algiers 1974); the phosphates group and the Union of Ballana
Export ing C',ount  ri e S ....1 7'"
F:acto r in~ol d in .aJ?-V: IcAoi - b t;w It /;JJ:~t
It is not possible on the basis of the data in Table A to state that a given
product should automatically lend  teel! to an agreement of a particular type.
The most that can be said is that I
essential foodstuffs should be covered by agreements involving a system of
minimum and maximum prices together with a stock-building policy in order
to achieve the harmonious development of prices, ensure oontinui ty of
supplies and facilitate the implementation of food aid progr es;
it is not possible in the case of perishable products to establish actual
physi oal at ooks ;
product s produced over a wide geographical area would. seem to need to be
controlled by the system with the strictest discipline, namely the buffer
at 0 ok syst em ;
products the prioes of which are diffioul t to determine, should not 
controlled by a financial mechanism which presupposes a certain degree of
pr10e preO1S10n.... t. Gel)
IV. ~:uP1P1~. 1~~ l 9A91;Us o~s
To conclude this first overall examination of the problem of produotlWtby--
product agreements, the Commission feels it is useful to sum up as
follows:
1 .. It finds that the existing agreements have not alW83'"s functioned
satisfactorily.
One of the possible reasons for these operating diffioul ties is the fact
that these agreements were design~l with the particular objective of
defending the producers' interests in periods of surplus and that the
conception and management of the agreements has not been gaided by the
desire to achieve an appropriate balanced policy.
The Commission feels that, with a wider and balanced political vision,
an improvement in the functioning of the agreements could be obtained,
and it is in this spirit that the Commission recently put forward
proposals in GATT for the conclusion of various agreements in the field
of temperate agricultural products.
20 The Commission, which has often affirmed the desirability of extending'
product agreements to raw materials in  appropriate oases
, '
considers that'
, .
the time has come to specify the' studies which' would enable. a .definitive
position' to be adopted on the. rvariouS oases.
The Commission considers that, where the conclusion of such agreements
seemed appropriate, they should be designed in such a w8\Y as to take
account of the mutual int erest s of produoers, and oonsumers, with all that
this implies from the angles of participation in the expenses, advantages
and management of the agreement s.;... 1~
The Commission has carried out an initial examination of the oonditioD8
which products ~t fulfil if' they are ;;0 be considered as possible
candidates for- such agreements.
' .' "
These conditions ~e numerous and no product corresponds to them in an
ideal wa;y.
However, copper, zinc, lead, cotton and wool fulfil a number of thes8
oondi tions and therefore appear to be the products on which studies
could concentrate, at the present stage.
4. The methods of operation of existing and possible agreements
m&l\Y and varied. In' the light of past experience and of the
existing structures of ' erler:nal trade, it
" , 
seems useful
however tG concentrate OBI
are
agreements with buffer stocks administered jointly qy exporters and OOnBuaer8
:wi th or wi thont rigid' maximum and minimum ' prices , this probably being the l
...
hazardous solution; 
the agreements based on a financial mechanism, since this is probably
the least expensive solution and is very flexible and can be combined
with other mechanisms.
5. In  event J it is neoess~ to oar~ out thorough technical and
economic studies in cooperation with private firms b~fore definitive
conclusions can be reached. These studies should cover both the products
and operating methods under the systems, the balance of advantages and
disadvantages in the various possible cases ~d the financing arrangement..
In each case, these studies should enable the limitations of the systems
to be pinpointed... 
20 ..
6. As far as financing is concerned, it sh~uld be noted first of all
that the requirements vary very widely aocori~ing to the systems and
operat ing methods oho san.
In numerous oases, however, large-scale financing will be neoessary, 
particularly while the agreements a;re being started up.
Various arrangements can be considered, either in isolation .or in
combination, in particular:
financing by the prod uoers and oonsumers, who sh'are the: ~osts ;
. .
1J. . the intervention of international financial bodies representing
the general interest t in particular the IMF;
iii'.: levies on transactions.T
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